|ISSUE 52 AUTUMN 2006
|the war on terror: past, present, future
From Afghanistan via Iraq to Lebanon
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, the US president incorporated al-Qaida into the wider concept of an “axis of evil” led by Iraq, Iran and North Korea; in a speech at West Point in June, Bush emphasised the US right to pre-empt perceived threats. Iraq was already in the military sights for regime termination, with Iran not far behind.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities there had been conspicuous European sympathy for the United States, with European newspapers such as Le Monde announcing their solidarity with the phrase: “We are all Americans now”. That had already started to dissipate by the early part of 2002, as it became apparent that the war on terror’s deeper agenda was largely driven by the desire to facilitate what the more fervent neo-conservative supporters of the Bush administration were calling a “new American century”.
The Washington view was that it was essential to maintain control of the world. Its model was impelled by a unilateralist stance owing much to a central tenet of the neocon outlook: what is good for the White House is good for the world.
A second regime, in Iraq, was eliminated – on the questionable grounds of possessing weapons of mass destruction or being linked to terrorist organisations. The US occupiers are currently facing a hugely difficult insurgency involving levels of violence higher than at any time since March 2003. There is now the prospect of a war with Iran.
The human and strategic cost
Since 9/11, some 100,000 people have been detained without trial, primarily but not exclusively in Iraq and Afghanistan. At any one time, about 15,000 individuals are being held in detention; overall, fewer than a thousand have been brought to any sort of trial and then convicted. Many hundreds have remained in prison for more than four years. Prisoner abuse – including rendition, torture and deaths in custody – has been persistent and extensive.
Many countries around the world have introduced tough new anti-terrorism laws; governments consistently point to threats and plots as justification for these harsher measures, many of which are in effect directed at minority Muslim communities.
The civilian casualties in Iraq are increasing rapidly. The Iraqi ministry of health reported 3,438 deaths in July, nearly double the number for January; this brought the total of violent deaths to well over 17,000 so far this year. While much of this is due to sectarian violence, attacks on US forces and Iraqi security units have also increased substantially (for example, 2,625 roadside bombs were planted in July compared with 1,454 in January).
Across the wider region, the growth of satellite TV news channels such as al-Jazeera is resulting in widespread knowledge of the impact of counterinsurgency operations, far more broadly than is represented in the western media. This is supplemented by skilful use of the web, videos and DVDs by groups linked to the wider al-Qaida movement. Coverage of Iraq, in particular, has greatly added to a bitter mood of anti-Americanism. The recent violence in Lebanon reinforces this trend, as well as confirming the portrayal of Israel as mainly a US surrogate in the region.
In one of the most extraordinary developments, Iraq is now becoming a focus of the global war on terror in that young jihadis from a number of countries (including Afghanistan) are now using it as a combat training-zone. The presence of US troops, with the many connections with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), can be presented powerfully as a neo-Christian / Zionist enterprise to occupy the seat of the historic Abbasid caliphate and control Arab oil. This is an effective recruiting tool for the wider jihadi movement.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is destabilising in the face of renewed Taliban activities. The recently completed 2006 opium harvest was at record levels; it showed an astonishing increase of 40% in the area planted over the previous year, comfortably exceeding the previous record year, 2004. This is despite hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on eradication programmes.
Furthermore, an increasing proportion of the raw opium is now refined into heroin and morphine within Afghanistan, adding hugely to the revenues accruing to the Taliban, warlords and other elements. As the Taliban offensive intensifies, the government across the border in Pakistan remains unable or unwilling to control paramilitary activity in its western districts bordering Afghanistan.
The al-Qaida factor
It is true that the al-Qaida movement lost some of its leaders and also faced geographical disruption during 2001-02. In practice, though, it has been transformed into a much more diffuse yet still potent entity with a multitude of connections, parallel paths and capabilities.
In addition to revealed or alleged plots in Britain, France, Italy, Singapore and the United States, al-Qaida has maintained a level of activity that has been substantially higher in the past five years than in the five years before 9/11. It or its affiliates have perpetrated at least thirty major attacks in that time: they include Karachi (three times), Islamabad, Bali (twice), Jakarta (twice), Istanbul (twice), London, Madrid, Sinai (three times), Riyadh, Tunis, Casablanca, Mombasa and many others.
Al-Qaida is now best characterised as more of a shared idea or outlook than a defined organisation. The sheer number of attacks across the world suggests that it is a movement which at least is maintaining – if not actually increasing – its level of activity. Its support-base is most certainly growing. Moreover, far from being a nihilistic phenomenon it is better described as an unusual transnational revolutionary movement rooted in a quasi-religious ideology which promotes a number of clear-cut aims.
These are, in the short term:
Al-Qaida’s survival and the manifest disasters of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan mean that an objective assessment of the past five years might well conclude that the effects of Bush’s global war on terror in relation to its impact on the al-Qaida movement and the wider mood of anti-Americanism, have been deeply and persistently counterproductive.
A change of policy?
Presidential statements to the effect that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) defeated Hizbollah in the Lebanese war may be far from reality. At the same time, there is a sense in which frequent reversals in the global war on terror only fuel the Bush administration’s reliance on its superpower military strength to seek to prevail.
Moreover, three further factors are hugely significant. First, the geopolitical significance of Persian Gulf oil reserves remains a key aspect of US strategy in the middle east. The Persian Gulf simply must be controlled by the United States, and, with the current establishment of permanent US military bases in Iraq, this makes a wholesale withdrawal from Iraq highly improbable in the next few years.
Second, it is entirely unacceptable that Afghanistan should become once more a free zone for al-Qaida and other Islamist paramilitaries to train and conserve their resources. The United States will not withdraw from that country, and the insurgency will most likely grow.
Third, a change in US policy towards Israel is unlikely in the extreme.
A major and continuing US presence in the region, coupled with opposition to a just Palestine/Israel settlement, facilitates a growing base for wider al-Qaida operations, whatever the political developments in Iraq. The combined effect is to suggest a long drawn-out war.
The London bombings of July 2005, and possibly the plot said to have been uncovered in August 2006, form one part of that war. More such attacks can be expected, especially in countries forming part of the current coalition.
This will involve an examination of the aims of the movement and an assessment of the most appropriate means of undercutting them. It is not evident that such a project forms any significant part of current policies. Perhaps this is not surprising, as it would require far less emphasis on military operations and a much greater concentration on political and social environments and measures. This is currently unfeasible, not least in the context of a possible military confrontation with Iran.
Full article at www.opendemocracy.net